Xiaorong Li
The news came last Friday that Liu Xiaobo, the best known Chinese dissident intellectual who lives in Beijing, was indicted on December 10, 2009, “International Human Rights Day,” by the Beijing Procuratorate. This move seems rather provocative or defiant, considering that the US President Obama had just returned from his China trip, where he has, no matter clearly or opaquely – a subject of debate, made statements advocating freedom of expression and information.
The Chinese leaders’ defiance to Mr. Obama and his call for more freedom of expression at the Shanghai “town hall” meeting with students carefully handpicked by the Chinese officials cannot be more accentuated by the fact that Mr. Liu is indicted for “drafting Charter 08 with others”, which the prosecution said was a “serious crime.” This means that writing and expressing views urging democratic reform and improving human rights is officially “a serious crime” in China and people go to jail for doing that, like Mr. Liu Xiaobo has for the past year.
Many may have wondered why the Chinese authorities chose at this time to indict Mr. Liu. But why wouldn't they? What would they have been worried about? One interesting question is whether the Obama Administration would learn something about the diminishing effectiveness of quiet private engagement on human rights with a big and increasingly more powerful country like China – if such a policy ever had any effectiveness at all before.
From talking to many people inside China, including Mr. Liu’s close friends, supporters, and his lawyers, I have heard it said repeatedly, often passionately, that the move against Liu Xiaobo and Charter 08, after having detained him and harassed other signatories for an whole year, is the outcome of the US President’s timid appeal in China. They told me that Obama’s appeals for human rights, which came in the form of praising freedom of expression on the internet and in a statement about agreeing to disagree about human rights during the joint press conference with the Chinese President Hu Jintao, were too weak and too vague. This seems to signal green light for the Chinese leaders to take strong actions on detained democrats and human rights activists, whose fate had been put on hold, as if awaiting for Obama’s visit.
It now looks like that US officials handed a short list of prisoners of conscience to the Chinese officials and President Obama may have personally conveyed the US government’s concerns about the individuals on the list to Hu Jintao. It was a private, quiet effort, to the Administration’s credit. But precisely because it was quiet and private, the Chinese leaders could easily pretend that they didn’t know anything and feel not pressure to respond. If this laudable effort ends there, out of the public view, it practically re-assured the Chinese leaders that the US would not protest loudly if they refuse to release these individuals or improve their conditions. The Chinese leaders seem to have concluded, quite logically, that the Obama administration, coming to Beijing to ask for help on several issues of importance to the US -- constraining Iran and N. Korea’s nuclear programs, slowing climate change, and re-balancing the economy -- would be too distracted by its own problems and unwilling to offend China by exerting any real pressure if the Chinese government went ahead convicting Liu Xiaobo and accusing drafting Charter 08 a crime.
For the Charter 08 writers and signatories, it might be better to be acknowledged than ignored by the Chinese government, but being officially labeled as having committed “a serious crime” sends a chill through the community. Charter 08, a public petition calling for democratic reform and protection of human rights, was initially signed by 303 Chinese on its release day on Dec. 9, 2008. In the past 12 months, more than 10,000 people have signed the petition, including about 8,000 residing on mainland China.
During those 12 months, other than the initial arrests, summons, interrogations, raids of homes and confiscation of personal property, the government has only published articles in official media to denounce “universal values” and “multi-party democracy,” but officials have rarely responded directly to Charter 08 by naming its name and have refrained from calling it a criminal act. Coming out finally to label drafting Charter 08 “a serious crime” clarifies speculations that, within top ranks of the leadership, officials were divided and some reformist inclined officials might be sympathetic to the drive or might have seen this as an opportunity to consolidate their power in the high-level power struggle.
Calling drafting Charter 08 a “crime” sends a stern warning to those who wrote, edited, or promoted this text, about one hundred of people, I was told, and to the thousands who signed the petition. For being implicated in this “criminal” act, they too could face imprisonment. The Chinese authorities clearly want to put them in their place: stop them from voicing their political views and threaten them with legal punishment for engaging in any political organizing!
Once again, the Chinese leaders behaved like calculating maximizers of benefits. Since they see no costly consequences for locking up its most vocal critic, and on the contrary, feeling confident they have had other big world powers tied around their fingers, they no longer need to make concessions by making a soft landing on Mr. Liu’s case. There is no obstacle in their path: They revert to do what the nature of their power has always seduced them to do – silencing dissent, stamping out any civil society mobilization for political change. Being calculating, rational, does not make an authoritarian one-party regime less authoritarian.
Let’s face it, it would not be entirely fair to call Obama’s China trip the worst or least successful in comparison to previous US Presidents’ China visits on account of the lack of any deal on prisoners’ releases this time. China is almost a different country today and the US-China relations are in a very different place as compared to the days of the Clinton’s and the Bushes’ presidencies. But quiet private diplomacy, an old strategy that didn’t quite work under these former presidents, is less likely to work now as China sees little bargain in such deals and no real pressure for compliance.
Obama could still have done better at making clear, strong, and eloquent statements on human rights and democracy on his China trip. The outcome might not have been different, given the weakened position of the US vs. China. But even if that were the case, the President would have at least stood the ground of US values and made the American people proud. And more importantly, to many Chinese democrats and human rights advocates, he would not have let them down.
December 14, 2009
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