Tuesday, October 10, 2006

China’s Failures and Human Rights Council’s Challenge

China’s “voluntary pledge,” made in May for the expressive purpose of winning a seat on the Human Rights Council, sounds ever more hollow these today. Breaking its own promises, China poses a serious challenge to the new HRC, which promises to provide stronger and more effective protection of human rights.

China pledged that, “The Chinese Government is committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Chinese people… The Chinese Government respects the universality of human rights and supports the UN in playing an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights.”

Having assured the votes to be elected, China went back to business as usual. In the same manner as in anticipation of major political events involving intense power struggle within the ruling elite, the Chinese leadership, citing security concerns, has staged a massive campaign to crackdown on human rights defenders, lawyers, and outspoken writers since mid-June. The leadership tries to strengthen its hand in controlling factions within the Communist Party and the party’s exclusive rule during the upcoming Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of Chinese Community Party (CCP) this fall, the 17th CCP Congress and general election to the National People’s Congress in 2007. Out of fear for critics and public exposes of its human rights problems during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the leadership has also begun silencing and imprisoning activists as part of the clean-up preparations.

The current crackdown has resulted in gross and systematic rights abuses. In the four months since it made the “voluntary pledge,” the government has acted aggressively to:
- Promulgate press control regulations on international media operating in China. In June, the government proposed huge fines (up to the equivalent of US$12,500) for journalists, foreign or domestic, who report “emergency incidents” such as clashes with police, epidemic outbreaks, or natural/man made disasters without official permission. On September 10, government imposed another measure making the official Xinhua News Agency as the only authorized distributor of all news and information by foreign news agencies operating in China, banning several categories of information.
- Close down countless online publications, discussion forums, and chat rooms, monitoring email correspondences, cell phone calls, text messages and instant messaging. In the past few months, government shut down popular websites and online forums frequented by activists and independent writers, such as the Aegean Sea, Century China, Dijin Minzhu, and so on.
- Detain human rights activists and lawyers. For example, the blind activist Chen Guangcheng in Shangdong, the rights activist/independent writer Guo Feixioang in Guangdong, and the Beijing human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng; the police have placed his wife and children under close and invasive surveillance since arresting him in mid-August.
- Charge democracy/human rights activists with political crimes that carry long prison terms or the death penalty: “incitement and sedition to overthrow the state.” For instance, the rights activists Guo Qizhen and several writers/democracy party activists have been charged with this crime. On September 6, authorities arrested Internet writer and former Aegean Sea Web site editor Zhang Jianhong. He is accused of “inciting subversion,” and faces a possible prison sentence of several years.
- Imprison (sentence) activists for peaceful activities. The blind activist was sentenced for 4 years and 3 months on August 20. On August 11, Tan Kai, an environmentalist from Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province and founder of the NGO called “Green Watch,” was convicted of “illegally acquiring state secrets” and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment. On August 25, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Zhao Yan, a researcher at the Beijing office of New York Times, to three years of imprisonment on charges of “fraud,” a trumped up charge to retaliate him paying close attention to peasant land rights and fair compensation, providing legal aid to help farmers who brought litigation against corrupt officials.
- Intensify persecution of unofficial “house church” members and demolish churches with many incidents in the eastern provinces. In one case, in Xiaoshan of Zhejiang Province, officials demolished a 200-year old Christian church in August and arrested more than 60 church members who opposed the demolition; Zan Aizong, a journalist, also a Christian, received seven days of administrative detention for reporting the demolition of this church. He was accused of “spreading rumors and disturbing public order.”
- Put hundreds of activists, outspoken critics, under house arrest or residential surveillance; some activists have been detained incommunicado or made to disappear for periods of time. On August 18, the activist Deng Yongliang and lawyer Zhang Jiankang, disappeared into police custody in Yinan, Shandong, and police denied knowledge of their whereabouts. They were eventually released.
- and authorize use of police force to suppress peaceful demonstrations by farmers demanding land rights. On August 9, 2006, Yao Baohua and Zhou Yaqin, representing landless peasants in Changzhou in Jiangsu Province were put under criminal detention by the local police and charged with “gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” They had been seeking to petition the local government and were expressing their views peacefully. On August 22, rights representative Liu Zhengyou in Zigong City, Sichuan Province was badly beaten by unidentified thugs right before the eyes of police. Liu has been urging the government to negotiate with peasants to settle a land dispute fairly and had been participating with the farmers in peaceful demonstrations.

This intensified crackdown on civil and political rights contradicts China “voluntary pledge” that “having signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), China is now in the process of amending its Criminal, Civil and Administrative Procedure Laws and deepening judicial reform to create conditions for ratification at an early date.” The government has instead switched on the green light for State Security Squads (SSS) and Public Security Bureaus (PSB) forces to override laws regulating detention and due process rights, which were recently enacted or amended, and to trespass the prohibits proscribed in ICCPR!

The government’s pattern of behavior also does not inspire any confidence that, even if the criminal, civil and administrative laws are amended and the ICCPR is ratified, rights conditions would see any brighter days. There is no indication the government will cease exempting itself from the country’s laws and its Constitution. Its behavioral patterns suggest it is now exempting itself from its membership obligations on the HRC.

Few among those who monitor rights conditions in China had their hopes up high upon hearing the “voluntary pledge,” though most had hoped the new HRC would handle China more professionally. The HRC faces a serious test to its ingenuity and sincerity – whether it too, like its predecessor, will play politics to the effect of muzzling critics of and diverting attention from rights abuses by a powerful member state. To some extent, the HRC’s promise to be a stronger, more effective, and more credible mechanism for promoting human rights, and to correct defects of the defunct Commission – politicization, double standards, regional alliance, “buying votes,” using procedures to block actions censuring abusive states, and other privileges in that “abusers club” - rest on whether and how the HRC will face up to China’s open challenge.

But can the HRC live up to its promises and does it have any real options in responding to China’s challenge? Consider the following two options that seem entailed in the promises the HRC made:

1. One is a review of China’s rights performance under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, a responsibility of the HRC, as set out in the General Assembly Resolution 60/251: This review would have a large body of “objective and reliable information” to draw upon since independent Chinese and international NGO monitors, foreign governmental and inter-governmental agencies (like the EU), have put out reports about human rights violations in China. During its current (second) session, the HRC has also heard reports from Thematic Special Procedures Mandates, for example, the report from Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, about his mission to China last year, which found “torture remains widespread” in the country. This body of information points to the failures of Chinese government in fulfilling its human rights obligations and commitments.

This option is at its best remote. The HRC has yet to schedule its UPR, which is understandable given its heavy agenda during the second session. At this point, it is unclear when the UPR will be ready to look into countries’ human rights behaviors and how politics among member states will play out in the reviewing process.

2. Another possible course of action is to conduct special review of allegations of China’s “gross and systematic violations of human rights” for consideration of suspending its membership: Under the terms of General Assembly Resolution 60/251, the Human Rights Council’s member states are elected in a secret ballot by an absolute majority of the General Assembly, but taking into account candidates’ contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights and voluntary pledges and commitments, etc. And any member that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights can be suspended by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority.

However, such a special review of China certainly will not take place within a meaningful timeframe. Even if such a review is put on the agenda, and sufficient information about “gross and systematic violations” is provided, it will be almost impossible to get two-thirds of the 47 member states to vote for suspending China’s membership.

It is very difficult to count on sufficient political will on the part of member states to make the HIC’s promises credible when it comes to China. Nevertheless, one can invest in international civil society stakeholders (NGOs, for example) to enable them to play an increasingly crucial role in pressuring the HRC to deliver on its promises, in providing reliable information, and in pressuring for reform of the UN human rights system – for example, by highlighting its inability to act when it must, as in the case of China.


Xiaorong Li

September 28, 2006

(This article appeared in Human Rights Features)

China’s Failures and Human Rights Council’s Challenge

China’s “voluntary pledge,” made in May for the expressive purpose of winning a seat on the Human Rights Council, sounds ever more hollow these today. Breaking its own promises, China poses a serious challenge to the new HRC, which promises to provide stronger and more effective protection of human rights.

China pledged that, “The Chinese Government is committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Chinese people… The Chinese Government respects the universality of human rights and supports the UN in playing an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights.”

Having assured the votes to be elected, China went back to business as usual. In the same manner as in anticipation of major political events involving intense power struggle within the ruling elite, the Chinese leadership, citing security concerns, has staged a massive campaign to crackdown on human rights defenders, lawyers, and outspoken writers since mid-June. The leadership tries to strengthen its hand in controlling factions within the Communist Party and the party’s exclusive rule during the upcoming Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of Chinese Community Party (CCP) this fall, the 17th CCP Congress and general election to the National People’s Congress in 2007. Out of fear for critics and public exposes of its human rights problems during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the leadership has also begun silencing and imprisoning activists as part of the clean-up preparations.

The current crackdown has resulted in gross and systematic rights abuses. In the four months since it made the “voluntary pledge,” the government has acted aggressively to:
- Promulgate press control regulations on international media operating in China. In June, the government proposed huge fines (up to the equivalent of US$12,500) for journalists, foreign or domestic, who report “emergency incidents” such as clashes with police, epidemic outbreaks, or natural/man made disasters without official permission. On September 10, government imposed another measure making the official Xinhua News Agency as the only authorized distributor of all news and information by foreign news agencies operating in China, banning several categories of information.
- Close down countless online publications, discussion forums, and chat rooms, monitoring email correspondences, cell phone calls, text messages and instant messaging. In the past few months, government shut down popular websites and online forums frequented by activists and independent writers, such as the Aegean Sea, Century China, Dijin Minzhu, and so on.
- Detain human rights activists and lawyers. For example, the blind activist Chen Guangcheng in Shangdong, the rights activist/independent writer Guo Feixioang in Guangdong, and the Beijing human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng; the police have placed his wife and children under close and invasive surveillance since arresting him in mid-August.
- Charge democracy/human rights activists with political crimes that carry long prison terms or the death penalty: “incitement and sedition to overthrow the state.” For instance, the rights activists Guo Qizhen and several writers/democracy party activists have been charged with this crime. On September 6, authorities arrested Internet writer and former Aegean Sea Web site editor Zhang Jianhong. He is accused of “inciting subversion,” and faces a possible prison sentence of several years.
- Imprison (sentence) activists for peaceful activities. The blind activist was sentenced for 4 years and 3 months on August 20. On August 11, Tan Kai, an environmentalist from Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province and founder of the NGO called “Green Watch,” was convicted of “illegally acquiring state secrets” and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment. On August 25, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Zhao Yan, a researcher at the Beijing office of New York Times, to three years of imprisonment on charges of “fraud,” a trumped up charge to retaliate him paying close attention to peasant land rights and fair compensation, providing legal aid to help farmers who brought litigation against corrupt officials.
- Intensify persecution of unofficial “house church” members and demolish churches with many incidents in the eastern provinces. In one case, in Xiaoshan of Zhejiang Province, officials demolished a 200-year old Christian church in August and arrested more than 60 church members who opposed the demolition; Zan Aizong, a journalist, also a Christian, received seven days of administrative detention for reporting the demolition of this church. He was accused of “spreading rumors and disturbing public order.”
- Put hundreds of activists, outspoken critics, under house arrest or residential surveillance; some activists have been detained incommunicado or made to disappear for periods of time. On August 18, the activist Deng Yongliang and lawyer Zhang Jiankang, disappeared into police custody in Yinan, Shandong, and police denied knowledge of their whereabouts. They were eventually released.
- and authorize use of police force to suppress peaceful demonstrations by farmers demanding land rights. On August 9, 2006, Yao Baohua and Zhou Yaqin, representing landless peasants in Changzhou in Jiangsu Province were put under criminal detention by the local police and charged with “gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” They had been seeking to petition the local government and were expressing their views peacefully. On August 22, rights representative Liu Zhengyou in Zigong City, Sichuan Province was badly beaten by unidentified thugs right before the eyes of police. Liu has been urging the government to negotiate with peasants to settle a land dispute fairly and had been participating with the farmers in peaceful demonstrations.

This intensified crackdown on civil and political rights contradicts China “voluntary pledge” that “having signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), China is now in the process of amending its Criminal, Civil and Administrative Procedure Laws and deepening judicial reform to create conditions for ratification at an early date.” The government has instead switched on the green light for State Security Squads (SSS) and Public Security Bureaus (PSB) forces to override laws regulating detention and due process rights, which were recently enacted or amended, and to trespass the prohibits proscribed in ICCPR!

The government’s pattern of behavior also does not inspire any confidence that, even if the criminal, civil and administrative laws are amended and the ICCPR is ratified, rights conditions would see any brighter days. There is no indication the government will cease exempting itself from the country’s laws and its Constitution. Its behavioral patterns suggest it is now exempting itself from its membership obligations on the HRC.

Few among those who monitor rights conditions in China had their hopes up high upon hearing the “voluntary pledge,” though most had hoped the new HRC would handle China more professionally. The HRC faces a serious test to its ingenuity and sincerity – whether it too, like its predecessor, will play politics to the effect of muzzling critics of and diverting attention from rights abuses by a powerful member state. To some extent, the HRC’s promise to be a stronger, more effective, and more credible mechanism for promoting human rights, and to correct defects of the defunct Commission – politicization, double standards, regional alliance, “buying votes,” using procedures to block actions censuring abusive states, and other privileges in that “abusers club” - rest on whether and how the HRC will face up to China’s open challenge.

But can the HRC live up to its promises and does it have any real options in responding to China’s challenge? Consider the following two options that seem entailed in the promises the HRC made:

1. One is a review of China’s rights performance under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, a responsibility of the HRC, as set out in the General Assembly Resolution 60/251: This review would have a large body of “objective and reliable information” to draw upon since independent Chinese and international NGO monitors, foreign governmental and inter-governmental agencies (like the EU), have put out reports about human rights violations in China. During its current (second) session, the HRC has also heard reports from Thematic Special Procedures Mandates, for example, the report from Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, about his mission to China last year, which found “torture remains widespread” in the country. This body of information points to the failures of Chinese government in fulfilling its human rights obligations and commitments.

This option is at its best remote. The HRC has yet to schedule its UPR, which is understandable given its heavy agenda during the second session. At this point, it is unclear when the UPR will be ready to look into countries’ human rights behaviors and how politics among member states will play out in the reviewing process.

2. Another possible course of action is to conduct special review of allegations of China’s “gross and systematic violations of human rights” for consideration of suspending its membership: Under the terms of General Assembly Resolution 60/251, the Human Rights Council’s member states are elected in a secret ballot by an absolute majority of the General Assembly, but taking into account candidates’ contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights and voluntary pledges and commitments, etc. And any member that commits gross and systematic violations of human rights can be suspended by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority.

However, such a special review of China certainly will not take place within a meaningful timeframe. Even if such a review is put on the agenda, and sufficient information about “gross and systematic violations” is provided, it will be almost impossible to get two-thirds of the 47 member states to vote for suspending China’s membership.

It is very difficult to count on sufficient political will on the part of member states to make the HIC’s promises credible when it comes to China. Nevertheless, one can invest in international civil society stakeholders (NGOs, for example) to enable them to play an increasingly crucial role in pressuring the HRC to deliver on its promises, in providing reliable information, and in pressuring for reform of the UN human rights system – for example, by highlighting its inability to act when it must, as in the case of China.


Xiaorong Li

September 28, 2006

(This article appeared in Human Rights Features)