- Opportunities and Potholes of the UN “Universal Periodic Review”
Thank you for this opportunity to address issues related to the upcoming UN HRC Universal Periodical Review on China. As the previous speaker Ms. Gaer has expertly described, the UPR is a brand new, thus very little known UN human rights tool.
For an organization like the UN, the establishment of UPR is remarkable. Only a few years ago, it would have been unimaginable to put China under international spotlight to scrutinize its human rights record in a comprehensive manner. Since 1989, almost every year, China had successfully blocked any vote on motions at the now-demised UN Human Rights Commission to put on its agenda to examine China’s human rights behavior! This once seemingly insurmountable hurdle now suddenly vanished!
However, UPR can be abused by UN member states, esp. those who are unfriendly to human rights and the process can be highly politicized, its effectiveness minimized. The UN is an intern-governmental organization, where member states lobby, bargain, and position themselves to advance their own national interest. China in particular has demonstrated its skillfulness to mount impressive efforts to lobby its “friendly” countries at UN venues.
Some common tactics that member states have used to undermine UPR in order to prevent a critical report on their performance are: (1) use “national human rights institutions” and government-organized “non-government organizations” (GONGOs) to submit rosy reports to dilute the 10-page compilation by the Office of the High Commissioner’s Office for Human Rights (OHCHR) of stakeholders’ submissions; (2) fill the 3-hour “interactive dialogue” with praises or irrelevant remarks by delegations from “friendly” countries; (3) using the opportunity for state party response to dismiss critical questions or independent NGO submissions as “slandering” or “fabrications.”
So why does China bother to buy into UPR or become a member of the HRC? That is a much larger question than I could address here. There are some interesting hypotheses on the table: (1) China wants to be treated as a member in good standing in the international community; China could not have opposed UPR while keeping a straight face because, when China rebutted critics of its human rights, it has accused them to be “selectively targeting China” or “politicizing human rights”; UPR applies to all countries. If you look at the China’s National Report, it refers to its own position on human rights as based on “equal respect”, “fairness”, “objectivity, non-selectiveness” ; (2) UPR has been structured in such a way that the pain for a state to undergo it is minimized, a point that I will come back to soon.]
China’s own “National Report” to the UPR Working Group is typical affair. It follows a pattern, as we have seen in China’s reports to Committee Against Torture or Committee on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, by presenting a positive assessment of its “great progress”, reiterating its commitment to promoting human rights, and highlighting legislative and regulatory steps, while glossing over ongoing violations and omitting the fact that many good-sounding laws are impossible to implement and officials who failed to implement them face little consequence.
One way to reduce UPR’s vulnerability to politicization and abuse is to facilitate active participation of civil society, or NGOs. One remarkable thing about UPR is its built-in openness, no matter how limited, for civil society intervention. To sufficiently explore the opportunity is the only way available to make UPR to have any impact.
[See Handout 1: the various opportunities for civil society involvement prior to, during, and after a country’s UPR review.]
So when the schedule to review China was set, the UPR Working Group called for NGO submissions last summer. 46 “stakeholders” (National human rights institutions and supposedly NGOs) submitted reports, each restricted to 5-pages. The UN OHCHR has compiled a file summarizing “credible and reliable” information from stakeholder’s submissions.
[See Handout 2: 46 stakeholders (NGOs and national human rights institutions). The list and the summery of submissions are on the OHCHR ]
Other than National HR Institutions, there are at least 3 types of organizations on the list: International NGOs, including Chinese, Tibet and Falungong groups overseas, Chinese (including HK) NGOs, and GONGOs. Two things are interesting: (1) Most of the groups from China are GONGOs, with few exceptions. The GONOG reports generally present “progress” and recommend legislations that are already been drafted or proposed. (2) Groups that working on Children, women, migrants, HIV/AIDS did make submissions. Yes there is no independent human rights NGOs like AI or HRW from the Mainland who made submissions, though some loose networks of activists/dissidents participated in the submissions with international groups.
The missing of Chinese domestic, openly operating, or “legally registered” human rights NGOs has to do with restrictive regulations and official crackdowns on independent NGOs.
So we can be almost certain, no Mainland Chinese human rights activist will attend the UPR session in Geneva in Feb., even though they might be invited to go by international NGOs. There is the risk factor: fear for being intercepted on the way out or retaliated against going back (one activist was recently interrogated several times, his home was raided and personal belonging confiscated. The policemen said they acted on the order from above to do anything to stop anyone from preparing a human rights report for the UPR!). But additionally, there are also obstacles such as travel costs, and UN ECOSOC accreditation, even for any legally registered groups.
Ironically, problems such as restriction on freedom of association, assembly, and speech, which the UPR is intended to examine and, hopefully, find solutions, play a key role in undermining UPR, diminishing its impact.
Another way to make UPR work is that human rights friendly member states should actively participate. The 3-hour “interactive dialogue” on Feb. 9 (9am-12) is open to all 192 countries (e.g. US is not HRC member, but can participate). The Feb. 11 session is when the record of the State reviews are considered, which lasts for 30 min (12-12:30), where China can respond or reject some recommendations. Then, there is a HRC plenary session several months later where the report is adopted. Only NGOs with ECOSOC accreditation can attend these sessions and can make statements only in the HRC session.
It is important to get into the final report of the UPR working group a concrete list of substantive recommendations with measurable results. This document will go in record as a testimony to China’s delivery after it has made pledges to promote human rights and signed numerous treaties, covenants and declarations on protecting human rights. All stakeholders in the next 4 years can refer to this document as yardstick to measure any progress China may or may not make. China will be in an awkward position to denounce such a document as “interference in its internal affairs” by “anti-China forces” with “ulterior motivations” – because China has gone through the process and participated in setting the rules and in reviews of other state parties. It can’t quite dismiss the process as “selective” or “unfair”.
What could the US delegation or any other human rights friendly countries do in the UPR process? The US is not a member of HRC, but has observer’s status.
Prepare one good question about an area of serious rights abuses and make one substantive but feasible recommendation.
For instance, given the importance of free speech as a fundamental human right, the US Permanent delegation could ask the question about the detention and harassment of signatories of Charter 08, who merely exercised their freedom of expression by endorsing a declaration on human rights and democracy. Ask for the release of detained signatory writer/intellectual Liu Xiaobo on suspicion of “inciting subversion against the state,” which is a crime frequently used in China to persecute free speech.
The US delegation could recommend that China to release Liu Xiaobo, and, for the long-term protection of free expression, to clarify and precisely define the meaning of the terms “incitement,” “subversion” and “state power” in Article 105(2) of the Chinese Criminal Code as well as the specific conditions under which a peaceful act of expression may constitute “inciting subversion against state power.” Such conditions must explicitly exclude any non-violent activity in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, including expressions critical of political parties and government authorities.
In connection to this last point, I should mention that I’d like to submit the English translation of Charter 08 by Perry Link that appeared in NYRB for the record.
Thank you!
Xiaorong Li
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China Roundtable, "The UN Human Rights Council's Review of China's Record:
Process and Challenges", January 16, 2009, 10-11:30am)
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Saturday, January 10, 2009
Mr. Obama Must Respond to Chinese Civil Society’s Call for Change
It appears imprudent to call the new Obama administration’s attention to China’s human rights problems. The US, in economic recession and in deep debt to China, is apparently in no position to demand anything of China. Yet, although a power player in the global economy, China is not immune to its own economic problems, which have caused social and political headaches for its authoritarian regime. At this critical moment, there is reason to hope that the US and the international community can actually exert a positive influence on China by promoting democratization and respect for human rights.
Democracy advocates in China have given President-elect Barack Obama and his Secretary of State-select an opportunity to provide leadership on these issues. A civil society campaign for democratic reform, emulating the Charter 77 movement in Cold War era Czechoslovakia and partly inspired by Mr. Obama, deserves the new administration’s support.
The call for sweeping political reforms in China came in early December in an online petition titled Charter 08. Upon learning about this petition, police detained one prominent intellectual, Liu Xiaobo, and interrogated another co-signer for 12 hours, after raiding their homes. Mr. Liu has remained in detention and more than 100 signatories have been interrogated since December 8. Vaclav Havel, leader of Charter 77 and former president of the democratic Czech Republic, denounced the arrest in the Wall Street Journal. Supporters of Mr. Liu in China are asking, “Why hasn’t the US President-elect voiced concerns about the detention of Liu Xiaobo and demanded a halt to the crackdown on the signatories of Charter 08?”
More than 5000 residents on Mainland China have since signed Charter 08, and Netizens briefly outsmarted Chinese cyberpolice censorship on the internet, indicating a measure of popular support for the Charter’s demands -- human rights, democracy, rule of law, and 19 steps toward an overhaul of governance, including putting an end to the one-party rule and protecting the natural environment. Compared to similar petitions circulated since 1989, Charter 08 has garnered support from a much wider swath of the population, far exceeded the drafters’ expectations. As a result, it has shaken those in power.
Chinese authorities have reasons to be nervous. Huge declines in Chinese exports and growth have prompted the closure of manufacturing plants and layoffs. This is the year that may reveal what happens when the Communist Party is no longer able to deliver on its deal with the population, a deal that Deng Xiaoping struck 30 years ago when he introduced market reforms: prosperity and morsels of personal freedom in exchange for political acquiescence to the Party’s rule.
The current economic recession has seen China’s nouveau middle classes disillusioned and workers disproportionately burdened. The Chinese official press reported that 10 million rural laborers, migrated to cities to look for jobs, have found no work in factories and are trickling back home. But 20% to 30% of farmers have lost their land to developers and have hardly any means of making a living. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ 2009 Blue Papers put urban unemployment rates at 9.4%.
Many in the hard-hit social groups are angry, and many are demanding justice and rights. According to official press, in 2008, from January to October, there was a 93.52 percent increase in labor protests from 2007, in the same months. Compared to 2007, there were 300% more protests demanding unpaid salaries in a city in the industrial costal regions.
The recent Third Session of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist Party Congress made economic recession and social unrest its top concern. President Hu Jintao’s speech at the October gathering of senior leaders stressed “stability” as the Party’s “rock-hard mandate.” A national conference on political and legal affairs held in Beijing in med-December made containing “mass incidents” (social riots) its priority.
Unwilling to allow China’s citizens to peacefully express their views and hold demonstrations, the Chinese state habitually responds to workers’ strikes, rural protests, and political or religious demonstrations with brute force, as it did 20 years ago to crush prodemocracy protests in Tiananmen Square, as it did 10 years ago to suppress the spiritual sect Falun Gong, and as it did 9 months ago to quell monks’ demonstrations in Tibet. The Party has never failed to rule out free expression and participatory governance as means to a peaceful transition to a stable society based on less corruption and more justice -- especially in times of widespread discontent and a pervading sense of crisis.
2009 happens to be a year of anniversaries with huge political symbolism: the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen suppression, the 50th of the exile of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, and the 60th of the Communist Party’s rise to power.
The new administration must respond to the current call from China’s non-state sectors for political change. The Obama presidency will be under pressure to gain China’s cooperation on matters of global importance like climate change, regional security, and nuclear proliferation. Yet it is in America’s long-term strategic interest to engage China in reforming its political system and ending repression. This is the only sensible way to ensure that China will respect international law, play according to rules, and cooperate on issues of global importance. As soon as possible, the new president should articulate a China policy that makes supporting civil society and promoting human rights and democracy a pillar, not a bargaining chip.
Mr. Obama should reach out directly to the Chinese citizenry, making clear to them that the American people want to support their pursuit of justice, democracy, prosperity and sustainable development. Soon after his inauguration, President Obama should announce U.S. intentions (1) to work with non-governmental sectors to strengthen civil society and support grassroots initiatives for democratic change; (2) to broaden exchange programs to include more civil society actors; (3) to work through multilateral organizations that have mechanisms for civil society participation, such as the newly established UN Human Rights Council, which is playing an active role in monitoring human rights and supporting rule-of-law reform in China and around the world; and (4) to restructure the recently resumed US-China “human rights dialogue” such that NGO participation, transparency, and measurable results are integral components of the bilateral efforts.
A 14-year-old boy in Beijing, the youngest of the signatories to Charter 08, remarked: “If Mr. Obama can be elected President of the United States, we too can change China!” Mr. Obama’s election has inspired much hope for democratic change in China and around the globe. He can keep that hope alive by firmly supporting civil society actors in their efforts to bring about this change. A crucial first step will be for Mr. Obama to call on President Hu Jintao to release Liu Xiaobo and to end the crackdown on thousands of signatories of Charter 08.
Democracy advocates in China have given President-elect Barack Obama and his Secretary of State-select an opportunity to provide leadership on these issues. A civil society campaign for democratic reform, emulating the Charter 77 movement in Cold War era Czechoslovakia and partly inspired by Mr. Obama, deserves the new administration’s support.
The call for sweeping political reforms in China came in early December in an online petition titled Charter 08. Upon learning about this petition, police detained one prominent intellectual, Liu Xiaobo, and interrogated another co-signer for 12 hours, after raiding their homes. Mr. Liu has remained in detention and more than 100 signatories have been interrogated since December 8. Vaclav Havel, leader of Charter 77 and former president of the democratic Czech Republic, denounced the arrest in the Wall Street Journal. Supporters of Mr. Liu in China are asking, “Why hasn’t the US President-elect voiced concerns about the detention of Liu Xiaobo and demanded a halt to the crackdown on the signatories of Charter 08?”
More than 5000 residents on Mainland China have since signed Charter 08, and Netizens briefly outsmarted Chinese cyberpolice censorship on the internet, indicating a measure of popular support for the Charter’s demands -- human rights, democracy, rule of law, and 19 steps toward an overhaul of governance, including putting an end to the one-party rule and protecting the natural environment. Compared to similar petitions circulated since 1989, Charter 08 has garnered support from a much wider swath of the population, far exceeded the drafters’ expectations. As a result, it has shaken those in power.
Chinese authorities have reasons to be nervous. Huge declines in Chinese exports and growth have prompted the closure of manufacturing plants and layoffs. This is the year that may reveal what happens when the Communist Party is no longer able to deliver on its deal with the population, a deal that Deng Xiaoping struck 30 years ago when he introduced market reforms: prosperity and morsels of personal freedom in exchange for political acquiescence to the Party’s rule.
The current economic recession has seen China’s nouveau middle classes disillusioned and workers disproportionately burdened. The Chinese official press reported that 10 million rural laborers, migrated to cities to look for jobs, have found no work in factories and are trickling back home. But 20% to 30% of farmers have lost their land to developers and have hardly any means of making a living. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ 2009 Blue Papers put urban unemployment rates at 9.4%.
Many in the hard-hit social groups are angry, and many are demanding justice and rights. According to official press, in 2008, from January to October, there was a 93.52 percent increase in labor protests from 2007, in the same months. Compared to 2007, there were 300% more protests demanding unpaid salaries in a city in the industrial costal regions.
The recent Third Session of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist Party Congress made economic recession and social unrest its top concern. President Hu Jintao’s speech at the October gathering of senior leaders stressed “stability” as the Party’s “rock-hard mandate.” A national conference on political and legal affairs held in Beijing in med-December made containing “mass incidents” (social riots) its priority.
Unwilling to allow China’s citizens to peacefully express their views and hold demonstrations, the Chinese state habitually responds to workers’ strikes, rural protests, and political or religious demonstrations with brute force, as it did 20 years ago to crush prodemocracy protests in Tiananmen Square, as it did 10 years ago to suppress the spiritual sect Falun Gong, and as it did 9 months ago to quell monks’ demonstrations in Tibet. The Party has never failed to rule out free expression and participatory governance as means to a peaceful transition to a stable society based on less corruption and more justice -- especially in times of widespread discontent and a pervading sense of crisis.
2009 happens to be a year of anniversaries with huge political symbolism: the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen suppression, the 50th of the exile of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, and the 60th of the Communist Party’s rise to power.
The new administration must respond to the current call from China’s non-state sectors for political change. The Obama presidency will be under pressure to gain China’s cooperation on matters of global importance like climate change, regional security, and nuclear proliferation. Yet it is in America’s long-term strategic interest to engage China in reforming its political system and ending repression. This is the only sensible way to ensure that China will respect international law, play according to rules, and cooperate on issues of global importance. As soon as possible, the new president should articulate a China policy that makes supporting civil society and promoting human rights and democracy a pillar, not a bargaining chip.
Mr. Obama should reach out directly to the Chinese citizenry, making clear to them that the American people want to support their pursuit of justice, democracy, prosperity and sustainable development. Soon after his inauguration, President Obama should announce U.S. intentions (1) to work with non-governmental sectors to strengthen civil society and support grassroots initiatives for democratic change; (2) to broaden exchange programs to include more civil society actors; (3) to work through multilateral organizations that have mechanisms for civil society participation, such as the newly established UN Human Rights Council, which is playing an active role in monitoring human rights and supporting rule-of-law reform in China and around the world; and (4) to restructure the recently resumed US-China “human rights dialogue” such that NGO participation, transparency, and measurable results are integral components of the bilateral efforts.
A 14-year-old boy in Beijing, the youngest of the signatories to Charter 08, remarked: “If Mr. Obama can be elected President of the United States, we too can change China!” Mr. Obama’s election has inspired much hope for democratic change in China and around the globe. He can keep that hope alive by firmly supporting civil society actors in their efforts to bring about this change. A crucial first step will be for Mr. Obama to call on President Hu Jintao to release Liu Xiaobo and to end the crackdown on thousands of signatories of Charter 08.
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Myths, challenges and opportunities
Xiaorong Li
February 19, 2003
There is a risk that human rights concerns in China may be swept under the carpet as the international community focuses exclusively on terrorism. Li Xiaorong explains why monitoring of China’s human rights should remain a priority.
________________________________________
One effect of the Bush Administration’s “global campaign against terrorism” is that human rights problems in China have been pushed even lower down on the diplomatic agenda. But the rights problems remain serious, and the international community may be missing some unprecedented opportunities to affect positive changes.
Long before September 11, 2001, the US government’s China policies had been based on the premise that American trade and strategic interests in China should not be compromised by human rights concerns. China has been very successful in blocking foreign efforts to push for human rights. Its success, as the political scientist Andrew Nathan argues, has to do with its rapidly growing economy and rising power status; skillful management of the international media; exploitation of domestic fears about political instability and nationalistic fervor; a UN Security Council seat which enables it to take the lead among like-minded governments; heavy lobbying and “divide and conquer” diplomacy with foreign governments and businesses; and skillful management of bilateral “dialogues” on human rights, which, as the HRIC report From Principle to Pragmatism has demonstrated, are mainly designed to give Western politicians something to show their domestic audiences.
It is not my intention to discuss the ethics and options for US foreign policy here. Instead, the purpose of this article is to assess future opportunities for concerned members of the international community to affect positive change on human rights in China. Towards this end, I call into question four widely-believed myths about China:
Myth No. 1: China is a much better place today than 20 years ago in that it has made huge progress in human rights, although its record is not perfect. There should be more encouragement and less criticism.
Myth No. 2: China is doing so well economically and has lifted many Chinese out of poverty. This is a major achievement in human rights. Human rights activists remain critical because they invoke Western standards, which emphasize civil-political rights over economic rights.
Myth No. 3: Critics of China’s human rights record only pay attention to a few individual dissidents. Individual liberties demanded by these dissidents matter little to the larger public or, worse, endanger public security and social order, which are crucial for China’s development and transition.
Myth No. 4: China has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), Beijing will host the Olympics in 2008 and the Chinese government has avoided censure at every annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission since 1990. There is no leverage left for the concerned international community to press for human rights improvements in China.
Challenging the myths
These claims can all be challenged. On Myth No. 1, is China really a much better place in terms of human rights today than it was 20 years ago? No doubt it is a more developed country and many more people are wealthier than ever before. But does this mean that China “has made huge progress in human rights”? There is not necessarily a logical connection between the two statements.
The claim that human rights conditions in China present a progressive trajectory is actually not proven. According to a study conducted by the China Human Rights Strategy Study Group from April 2000 to November 2001 and sponsored by the Open Society Institute and Human Rights in China, “Promotin
Other major problems include intensified repression of social groups that are perceived as potentially posing challenges to the government, including laid off workers, peasants who protest official abuse, local corruption, and heavy levies, and HIV/AIDS activist groups; excessive use of the death penalty; torture and police brutality; repression of religious groups such as the Falungong and Catholics loyal to the Pope; harsh repression in minority regions in Tibet and Xinjiang; persecution of political dissidents and the use of administrative detention under Reeducation Through Labor and Custody and Repatriation.
In a worldwide survey, Amnesty International found that China has had the highest number of reported executions of any country in the world every year since 1993. Last year, according to published reports China executed 2,468 people and sentenced 4,015 to death. HRIC found that about three million people are sent to Custody and Repatriation centers each year, mostly because they are away from their place of registered residence and have not obtained the proper papers. Approximately 5-20 percent of them are children. Those in C&R may be held for months, without any charge or trial, before they are sent back to their hometowns or villages. Currently approximately 300,000 people are being held in Reeducation Through Labor (RETL) camps for “crimes” ranging from “disturbing public order” to minor drug offenses. RETL may be imposed by the police without a trial for up to three years, while most sentences range from six months to two years. Finally, there are areas of ambiguous development in criminal procedure law, independence of the courts, birth control related violence and gay rights. Homosexuality had been penalized under the “hooliganism” provision under the Criminal Code but this has now been removed. The Chinese Association of Psychiatry has also removed homosexuality from its classification of mental diseases.
Based on this assessment, one cannot conclude that China’s human rights have improved across the board. Certainly no overall linear progression can be detected. Given the pattern of uneven changes, if the Chinese authorities are left to their own devices, without public scrutiny and international monitoring, it is not guaranteed that the ability of Chinese people to exercise their rights would automatically improve. Furthermore, even if it turns out that human rights progress has been made, this does not imply that China should from now on be praised and never criticized. For example, even though the United States is a better place today in terms of civil rights than it was 50 years ago when women did not have the right to vote and segregation was legal, should one no longer criticize civil rights violations in today’s American society?
Economy first?
The claim that economic growth has substantially improved rights conditions raises the question of whether growth in China’s economy has been translated into human rights progress, or more precisely, into better economic rights protection.
The Communist Party’s decision to allow market-driven, incentive-based economic activities has rendered impractical the totalitarian Party-state, which aspired to transform human nature by controlling people’s minds and private lives, and created a shift to an authoritarian police state. Notwithstanding that economic marketization has widened the sphere of individual autonomy, Chinese citizens still do not have reliable and legally–protected rights to basic liberties.
There are complex changes in the sphere of socio-economic rights that reflect the mixed effects of rising GDP and the collapse of the socialist welfare system. Aggregate growth rates do not ensure better or fairer access to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education and work. Today, economic disparities between the poor and the rich continue to grow. The number of urban poor are on the rise as workers who suffer from layoffs, unpaid salaries and lost pensions struggle for basic subsistence. While average salaries are more than they were 20 years ago, purchasing power has not increased at the same rate and people can no longer count on subsidized housing, education and medical care. The Chinese government may be justifying stepping up control and repression in order to manage these tensions.
Chinese government data indicate that, by the end of 1996, 58 million people in China were living under the official poverty line, which the State Council defined as $0.66 per person per day. According to the World Bank, at the end of 1998 about 11.5 percent of China’s rural population, or about 106 million people, lived below the poverty line, which the Bank defined as $1 per day or less. However, these data are questionable: only two years before, the Bank had put the number of people in China living on $1 or less per day at 350 million. Many so-called “winners” in the new economy have not had to play by market rules. They gained exclusive access to capital and vital investment information through positions of power or connections. And many so-called “losers” never had a chance, and have no social safety net to protect them.
The lack of protection for civil-political rights—which the government has rejected because they are perceived as a threat to its power monopoly—is an acute problem. The absence of such rights constrains the disadvantaged, exploited and marginalized citizens in demanding protection for their social-economic rights, particularly when they face a much higher risk of losing out and going under. For example, the constraints on the ability of citizens to petition against the health consequences of environmental damage, layoffs, unpaid pensions, workplace hazards and heavy burdens of numerous levies and fees imposed on farmers have left victims helpless and vulnerable to abuses.
One recent example is the independent efforts to address the emerging public health disaster of HIV/AIDS infections and deaths in poor, rural areas of Henan Province. Activists have encountered official hostility, harassment and intimidation because the local government apparently perceives such efforts as political threats, since they would tarnish the image of the leaders and expose systematic lapses in the government’s health care policies. In Henan Province, hundreds of thousands of villagers have become infected with HIV because they sold their blood to the officially-sponsored blood collectors. These used outdated and risky methods for the blood collection, which resulted in the rapid spread of HIV infection. The Henan government tried to cover up the scandal until 2001, and did not develop a plan or allocate the necessary resources to respond to the crisis. The non-existent health care system in rural China left hundreds of thousands to suffer and die in agony. This situation has created a new array of social problems, including prejudice and discrimination against HIV infected families, and orphans and elderly people left behind without care. Schools have even closed doors to children who are HIV positive or whose parents are infected. (See page 14 for more information.)
If the Chinese government, and local governments, had allowed more civil-political freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, association and the press, there would have been a better chance of preventing this devastating public health crisis
Another example involves migrant workers. Even though peasants are now able to migrate to work in cities, they are subjected to horrendous treatment and exploitation and, worse, they have few rights to seek redress or to protest. Some workers in state industries have managed to organize marches and sit ins, but their leaders have ended up in jail. The lack of accountability and a democratic system means that their voices count minimally in policy decisions concerning their livelihood.
Are individual cases illustrative?
The recent trends in China’s human rights record show that the rights of large population groups, such as migrant laborers, laid off workers and rural residents, remain unprotected. The more than 33 million Internet users are affected by the state’s censorship of telecommunications and information. The banning and subsequent repression of the Falungong group, which claims to have more than 100 million members, has obviously had an impact on millions.
Myth No. 3 involves clearly defining the term “individual rights.” Individual rights signify that each person has the agency to determine the nature of their basic rights. It does not mean that such rights are the exclusively determined by a few individuals. If a state has the ability to terrorize a minority community of political dissidents or unorthodox religious believers, this implies it could terrorize any group that held political views or religious beliefs that the government perceived as a threat. This is a simple point on which we tend to lose perspective. If Rodney King could be brutally beaten by up by policemen in Los Angeles, then the civil rights of all Americans (or at least all African-Americans) may be at risk.
In the United States, any government restriction on civil liberties, even if officials seek to justify it as being in the public interest, has to stand up to public scrutiny. Many Americans have questioned the way immigrants have been treated since September 11. Even given the extraordinary circumstances of the time, Americans insist that the Bush Administration be held accountable for demonstrating that the threats are real and that any measures taken are fair and justifiable. The Chinese government has claimed that opening fire on peaceful demonstrators in June 1989, imprisoning political dissidents, persecuting religious minorities, arresting independent labor organizers and curtailing information on the Internet are necessary to maintain stability and social order. But it forbids anyone to challenge these claims, and those who are bold enough to question such actions risk imprisonment.
No leverage left?
Pressure on human rights brought to bear by foreign governments and NGOs on the Chinese government has produced improvements that are either declaratory, such as accession to international covenants, or short-term, such as the release of particular prisoners. Prisoners of conscience have reported improved treatment due to international pressure. However, efforts to bring about long-term, broad-ranging structural reform have not been successful. A few other strategies have worked well at specific times, in particular publicity campaigns focused on individual prisoners or cases, threats to “most favored nation” trade status and the use of “quiet diplomacy” to obtain information and secure prisoner releases.
Other strategies have not worked as well as advertised, specifically bilateral human rights dialogues, because of their exclusiveness and non-transparency, and Internet-based and other information dissemination programs, due to Chinese government “firewalls” and the fact that they are narrowly targeted at intellectuals and professionals. It is too early to assess the impact of programs in the area of “capacity building,” which include programs that train judges, National People’s Congress staff and other legal professionals, or help in legislative drafting.
Still, a concerned international community is now presented with unprecedented opportunities to facilitate positive changes in China through channels such as the United Nations and the WTO. China has become increasingly engaged in multilateral human rights institutions and has acceded to UN treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention Against Torture. China’s membership in the WTO has reduced the international community’s opportunity to use economic pressures. While WTO membership may accelerate legal reforms and add impetus to the pace of moves towards transparency, it may also exacerbate the mixed human rights impacts of economic restructuring by intensifying social tensions and thus create a perceived need for state repression. However, both UN treaties and processes associated with WTO offer new points of access for human rights work.
Furthermore, the impending retirements of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng are creating a power struggle within the top ranks of the government. The succession could make possible a transition to a more human-rights friendly regime, although a fierce power struggle is more likely to make it difficult in the short run for pro-human rights forces within China and in the international community to exert influence. To prepare for the 16th Party Congress, the authorities have tightened controls on the media and the Internet by increasing censorship, and the dissident community is under increased surveillance while some activists have been detained.
These opportunities and obstacles should be considered in the international community’s strategic thinking about international monitoring. Issues that are most serious and urgent include due process rights and the extensive use of the death penalty, arbitrary detention, the Reeducation Through Labor system, torture, religious persecution and harsh crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang justified as campaigns against terrorism and separatism. (In the Xinjiang case, this crackdown was provided with some “legitimacy” when the Bush Administration declared the East Turkestan Independence Movement a “terrorist group” and supported its addition to the UN list of such groups.) Areas where it may be easier to win improvements due to social or ideological changes include the rights of women, children and workers; class discrimination in education and health care; housing rights; and environmental rights. Finally, issues that are most amenable to influence from outside include cases of persecuted individuals and groups, legal reform, welfare reform, freedom of information and freedom of religion.
Looking ahead
To conclude, concerned governments, NGOs, and citizens of democratic nations should seize opportunities to affect positive change in China. Through their professional affiliations and through intellectual and cultural exchanges, they can exert a long-term pro-human rights impact. Exchanges between scholars, students and artists make possible the open communication of ideas, culture and values. Through their shareholder rights in corporations doing business in China, investors can demand ethically-responsible investment and protection of local employees’ rights and of the environment.
Through representatives and other channels of political participation, people can monitor their governments’ policies on China and insist that human rights issues should not be eclipsed by other strategic priorities or “national interests.”
In the post-September 11 era, the temptation for governments of democratic nations to sweep human rights under the carpet of national security is strong. If protecting US national security entails eliminating potential threats to American lives, then US foreign policies ought not to encourage and support authoritarian governments under which brutal repression and unjust policies alienate groups and individuals thus escalating political tension among disaffected and mistreated minorities. Promoting human rights and democracy in China is in the long-term interest of American national security.
(This article, published in China Rights Forum, is based on a written speech for the Unitarian Church organized retreat on Star Island in the summer of 2002)
February 19, 2003
There is a risk that human rights concerns in China may be swept under the carpet as the international community focuses exclusively on terrorism. Li Xiaorong explains why monitoring of China’s human rights should remain a priority.
________________________________________
One effect of the Bush Administration’s “global campaign against terrorism” is that human rights problems in China have been pushed even lower down on the diplomatic agenda. But the rights problems remain serious, and the international community may be missing some unprecedented opportunities to affect positive changes.
Long before September 11, 2001, the US government’s China policies had been based on the premise that American trade and strategic interests in China should not be compromised by human rights concerns. China has been very successful in blocking foreign efforts to push for human rights. Its success, as the political scientist Andrew Nathan argues, has to do with its rapidly growing economy and rising power status; skillful management of the international media; exploitation of domestic fears about political instability and nationalistic fervor; a UN Security Council seat which enables it to take the lead among like-minded governments; heavy lobbying and “divide and conquer” diplomacy with foreign governments and businesses; and skillful management of bilateral “dialogues” on human rights, which, as the HRIC report From Principle to Pragmatism has demonstrated, are mainly designed to give Western politicians something to show their domestic audiences.
It is not my intention to discuss the ethics and options for US foreign policy here. Instead, the purpose of this article is to assess future opportunities for concerned members of the international community to affect positive change on human rights in China. Towards this end, I call into question four widely-believed myths about China:
Myth No. 1: China is a much better place today than 20 years ago in that it has made huge progress in human rights, although its record is not perfect. There should be more encouragement and less criticism.
Myth No. 2: China is doing so well economically and has lifted many Chinese out of poverty. This is a major achievement in human rights. Human rights activists remain critical because they invoke Western standards, which emphasize civil-political rights over economic rights.
Myth No. 3: Critics of China’s human rights record only pay attention to a few individual dissidents. Individual liberties demanded by these dissidents matter little to the larger public or, worse, endanger public security and social order, which are crucial for China’s development and transition.
Myth No. 4: China has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), Beijing will host the Olympics in 2008 and the Chinese government has avoided censure at every annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission since 1990. There is no leverage left for the concerned international community to press for human rights improvements in China.
Challenging the myths
These claims can all be challenged. On Myth No. 1, is China really a much better place in terms of human rights today than it was 20 years ago? No doubt it is a more developed country and many more people are wealthier than ever before. But does this mean that China “has made huge progress in human rights”? There is not necessarily a logical connection between the two statements.
The claim that human rights conditions in China present a progressive trajectory is actually not proven. According to a study conducted by the China Human Rights Strategy Study Group from April 2000 to November 2001 and sponsored by the Open Society Institute and Human Rights in China, “Promotin
Other major problems include intensified repression of social groups that are perceived as potentially posing challenges to the government, including laid off workers, peasants who protest official abuse, local corruption, and heavy levies, and HIV/AIDS activist groups; excessive use of the death penalty; torture and police brutality; repression of religious groups such as the Falungong and Catholics loyal to the Pope; harsh repression in minority regions in Tibet and Xinjiang; persecution of political dissidents and the use of administrative detention under Reeducation Through Labor and Custody and Repatriation.
In a worldwide survey, Amnesty International found that China has had the highest number of reported executions of any country in the world every year since 1993. Last year, according to published reports China executed 2,468 people and sentenced 4,015 to death. HRIC found that about three million people are sent to Custody and Repatriation centers each year, mostly because they are away from their place of registered residence and have not obtained the proper papers. Approximately 5-20 percent of them are children. Those in C&R may be held for months, without any charge or trial, before they are sent back to their hometowns or villages. Currently approximately 300,000 people are being held in Reeducation Through Labor (RETL) camps for “crimes” ranging from “disturbing public order” to minor drug offenses. RETL may be imposed by the police without a trial for up to three years, while most sentences range from six months to two years. Finally, there are areas of ambiguous development in criminal procedure law, independence of the courts, birth control related violence and gay rights. Homosexuality had been penalized under the “hooliganism” provision under the Criminal Code but this has now been removed. The Chinese Association of Psychiatry has also removed homosexuality from its classification of mental diseases.
Based on this assessment, one cannot conclude that China’s human rights have improved across the board. Certainly no overall linear progression can be detected. Given the pattern of uneven changes, if the Chinese authorities are left to their own devices, without public scrutiny and international monitoring, it is not guaranteed that the ability of Chinese people to exercise their rights would automatically improve. Furthermore, even if it turns out that human rights progress has been made, this does not imply that China should from now on be praised and never criticized. For example, even though the United States is a better place today in terms of civil rights than it was 50 years ago when women did not have the right to vote and segregation was legal, should one no longer criticize civil rights violations in today’s American society?
Economy first?
The claim that economic growth has substantially improved rights conditions raises the question of whether growth in China’s economy has been translated into human rights progress, or more precisely, into better economic rights protection.
The Communist Party’s decision to allow market-driven, incentive-based economic activities has rendered impractical the totalitarian Party-state, which aspired to transform human nature by controlling people’s minds and private lives, and created a shift to an authoritarian police state. Notwithstanding that economic marketization has widened the sphere of individual autonomy, Chinese citizens still do not have reliable and legally–protected rights to basic liberties.
There are complex changes in the sphere of socio-economic rights that reflect the mixed effects of rising GDP and the collapse of the socialist welfare system. Aggregate growth rates do not ensure better or fairer access to adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education and work. Today, economic disparities between the poor and the rich continue to grow. The number of urban poor are on the rise as workers who suffer from layoffs, unpaid salaries and lost pensions struggle for basic subsistence. While average salaries are more than they were 20 years ago, purchasing power has not increased at the same rate and people can no longer count on subsidized housing, education and medical care. The Chinese government may be justifying stepping up control and repression in order to manage these tensions.
Chinese government data indicate that, by the end of 1996, 58 million people in China were living under the official poverty line, which the State Council defined as $0.66 per person per day. According to the World Bank, at the end of 1998 about 11.5 percent of China’s rural population, or about 106 million people, lived below the poverty line, which the Bank defined as $1 per day or less. However, these data are questionable: only two years before, the Bank had put the number of people in China living on $1 or less per day at 350 million. Many so-called “winners” in the new economy have not had to play by market rules. They gained exclusive access to capital and vital investment information through positions of power or connections. And many so-called “losers” never had a chance, and have no social safety net to protect them.
The lack of protection for civil-political rights—which the government has rejected because they are perceived as a threat to its power monopoly—is an acute problem. The absence of such rights constrains the disadvantaged, exploited and marginalized citizens in demanding protection for their social-economic rights, particularly when they face a much higher risk of losing out and going under. For example, the constraints on the ability of citizens to petition against the health consequences of environmental damage, layoffs, unpaid pensions, workplace hazards and heavy burdens of numerous levies and fees imposed on farmers have left victims helpless and vulnerable to abuses.
One recent example is the independent efforts to address the emerging public health disaster of HIV/AIDS infections and deaths in poor, rural areas of Henan Province. Activists have encountered official hostility, harassment and intimidation because the local government apparently perceives such efforts as political threats, since they would tarnish the image of the leaders and expose systematic lapses in the government’s health care policies. In Henan Province, hundreds of thousands of villagers have become infected with HIV because they sold their blood to the officially-sponsored blood collectors. These used outdated and risky methods for the blood collection, which resulted in the rapid spread of HIV infection. The Henan government tried to cover up the scandal until 2001, and did not develop a plan or allocate the necessary resources to respond to the crisis. The non-existent health care system in rural China left hundreds of thousands to suffer and die in agony. This situation has created a new array of social problems, including prejudice and discrimination against HIV infected families, and orphans and elderly people left behind without care. Schools have even closed doors to children who are HIV positive or whose parents are infected. (See page 14 for more information.)
If the Chinese government, and local governments, had allowed more civil-political freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, association and the press, there would have been a better chance of preventing this devastating public health crisis
Another example involves migrant workers. Even though peasants are now able to migrate to work in cities, they are subjected to horrendous treatment and exploitation and, worse, they have few rights to seek redress or to protest. Some workers in state industries have managed to organize marches and sit ins, but their leaders have ended up in jail. The lack of accountability and a democratic system means that their voices count minimally in policy decisions concerning their livelihood.
Are individual cases illustrative?
The recent trends in China’s human rights record show that the rights of large population groups, such as migrant laborers, laid off workers and rural residents, remain unprotected. The more than 33 million Internet users are affected by the state’s censorship of telecommunications and information. The banning and subsequent repression of the Falungong group, which claims to have more than 100 million members, has obviously had an impact on millions.
Myth No. 3 involves clearly defining the term “individual rights.” Individual rights signify that each person has the agency to determine the nature of their basic rights. It does not mean that such rights are the exclusively determined by a few individuals. If a state has the ability to terrorize a minority community of political dissidents or unorthodox religious believers, this implies it could terrorize any group that held political views or religious beliefs that the government perceived as a threat. This is a simple point on which we tend to lose perspective. If Rodney King could be brutally beaten by up by policemen in Los Angeles, then the civil rights of all Americans (or at least all African-Americans) may be at risk.
In the United States, any government restriction on civil liberties, even if officials seek to justify it as being in the public interest, has to stand up to public scrutiny. Many Americans have questioned the way immigrants have been treated since September 11. Even given the extraordinary circumstances of the time, Americans insist that the Bush Administration be held accountable for demonstrating that the threats are real and that any measures taken are fair and justifiable. The Chinese government has claimed that opening fire on peaceful demonstrators in June 1989, imprisoning political dissidents, persecuting religious minorities, arresting independent labor organizers and curtailing information on the Internet are necessary to maintain stability and social order. But it forbids anyone to challenge these claims, and those who are bold enough to question such actions risk imprisonment.
No leverage left?
Pressure on human rights brought to bear by foreign governments and NGOs on the Chinese government has produced improvements that are either declaratory, such as accession to international covenants, or short-term, such as the release of particular prisoners. Prisoners of conscience have reported improved treatment due to international pressure. However, efforts to bring about long-term, broad-ranging structural reform have not been successful. A few other strategies have worked well at specific times, in particular publicity campaigns focused on individual prisoners or cases, threats to “most favored nation” trade status and the use of “quiet diplomacy” to obtain information and secure prisoner releases.
Other strategies have not worked as well as advertised, specifically bilateral human rights dialogues, because of their exclusiveness and non-transparency, and Internet-based and other information dissemination programs, due to Chinese government “firewalls” and the fact that they are narrowly targeted at intellectuals and professionals. It is too early to assess the impact of programs in the area of “capacity building,” which include programs that train judges, National People’s Congress staff and other legal professionals, or help in legislative drafting.
Still, a concerned international community is now presented with unprecedented opportunities to facilitate positive changes in China through channels such as the United Nations and the WTO. China has become increasingly engaged in multilateral human rights institutions and has acceded to UN treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention Against Torture. China’s membership in the WTO has reduced the international community’s opportunity to use economic pressures. While WTO membership may accelerate legal reforms and add impetus to the pace of moves towards transparency, it may also exacerbate the mixed human rights impacts of economic restructuring by intensifying social tensions and thus create a perceived need for state repression. However, both UN treaties and processes associated with WTO offer new points of access for human rights work.
Furthermore, the impending retirements of Jiang Zemin and Li Peng are creating a power struggle within the top ranks of the government. The succession could make possible a transition to a more human-rights friendly regime, although a fierce power struggle is more likely to make it difficult in the short run for pro-human rights forces within China and in the international community to exert influence. To prepare for the 16th Party Congress, the authorities have tightened controls on the media and the Internet by increasing censorship, and the dissident community is under increased surveillance while some activists have been detained.
These opportunities and obstacles should be considered in the international community’s strategic thinking about international monitoring. Issues that are most serious and urgent include due process rights and the extensive use of the death penalty, arbitrary detention, the Reeducation Through Labor system, torture, religious persecution and harsh crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang justified as campaigns against terrorism and separatism. (In the Xinjiang case, this crackdown was provided with some “legitimacy” when the Bush Administration declared the East Turkestan Independence Movement a “terrorist group” and supported its addition to the UN list of such groups.) Areas where it may be easier to win improvements due to social or ideological changes include the rights of women, children and workers; class discrimination in education and health care; housing rights; and environmental rights. Finally, issues that are most amenable to influence from outside include cases of persecuted individuals and groups, legal reform, welfare reform, freedom of information and freedom of religion.
Looking ahead
To conclude, concerned governments, NGOs, and citizens of democratic nations should seize opportunities to affect positive change in China. Through their professional affiliations and through intellectual and cultural exchanges, they can exert a long-term pro-human rights impact. Exchanges between scholars, students and artists make possible the open communication of ideas, culture and values. Through their shareholder rights in corporations doing business in China, investors can demand ethically-responsible investment and protection of local employees’ rights and of the environment.
Through representatives and other channels of political participation, people can monitor their governments’ policies on China and insist that human rights issues should not be eclipsed by other strategic priorities or “national interests.”
In the post-September 11 era, the temptation for governments of democratic nations to sweep human rights under the carpet of national security is strong. If protecting US national security entails eliminating potential threats to American lives, then US foreign policies ought not to encourage and support authoritarian governments under which brutal repression and unjust policies alienate groups and individuals thus escalating political tension among disaffected and mistreated minorities. Promoting human rights and democracy in China is in the long-term interest of American national security.
(This article, published in China Rights Forum, is based on a written speech for the Unitarian Church organized retreat on Star Island in the summer of 2002)
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